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ANTHROPIC OBSERVATION SELECTION EFFECTS
AND THE DESIGN ARGUMENT
Ira M. Schnall

The Argument from Fine-Tuning, a relatively new version of the Design Argument, has given rise to an objection, based on what is known as the Anthropic Principle. It is alleged that the argument is fallacious in that it involves
an observation selection effect—that given the existence of intelligent living
observers, the observation that the universe is fine-tuned for the existence of
intelligent life is not surprising. Many find this objection puzzling, or at least
easily refutable. My main contribution to the discussion is to offer an analysis
of what is wrong (and what is right) in the objection.

1. Introduction
In the latter part of the twentieth century, the traditional theological argument from design (DA) was given a new twist, based on discoveries in
physics and cosmology. It was discovered that several apparently mutually independent physical constants have just the precise values that allow
for the existence of life, and in particular, of intelligent life, in the universe.
Had the value of any of these constants been even slightly different, or
had the initial conditions present at the forming of the universe been even
slightly other than they actually were, the development of intelligent life
would have been impossible, given the fundamental laws of nature. It is argued that such a precise, delicate balance of mutually independent factors,
resulting in an outcome as striking as intelligent life—such fine-tuning, as it
is called—must be due to conscious, intelligent, purposeful design. Hence
this new version of DA is called ‘the argument from fine-tuning.’1
This new version of DA has an advantage over traditional versions,
which were based primarily on the “curious adapting of means to ends”2
that is exhibited by biological organisms: Darwin’s theory of evolution by
random mutation and natural selection provided a naturalistic explanation of biological adaptation of means to ends, so that the supernaturalistic design hypothesis was rendered unnecessary; but Darwin’s theory is
not straightforwardly applicable to the cosmic fine-tuning which serves
1
See, for example, Neil A. Manson, “Introduction,” in God and Design, ed. Neil
A. Manson (London: Routledge, 2003), especially pp. 3–4.
2
The phrase is from David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Part II;
in the Nelson Pike edition (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970), p. 22.
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as the basis of the new version, and so it is argued that this fine-tuning
supports the hypothesis of intelligent design over all available naturalistic
alternatives.3
However, this new version of DA has given rise to a new sort of objection,
based on what is called ‘the anthropic principle’ (AP): “given our presence
in the universe as observers, it necessarily follows that the requisite conditions for intelligent life have been met; therefore we should not be surprised
that we observe a universe with initial conditions, laws, and constants that
allow for intelligent life.”4 The fact that we should not be surprised by the
fine-tuning of the universe is supposed to undermine the fine-tuning version of DA. (Henceforth I will use ‘DA’ exclusively for the fine-tuning version, unless otherwise specified.) Precisely how AP undermines DA is far
from clear. Proponents of DA tend to find the AP objection, as we may call
it, puzzling; counterexamples, in the form of logical analogies, have been
offered to show that the AP objection is not a serious threat to DA.5
Elliott Sober has presented the AP objection to DA and has defended it
vigorously.6 However, I find his defense ultimately unsuccessful. My aim
in this paper is to examine and analyze the AP objection, as elaborated and
defended by Sober. I will claim that though it is more serious than proponents of DA generally think it is, nevertheless it does not undermine DA,
if DA is understood, or construed, in a particular way—the way I believe
proponents of DA generally do implicitly, and sometimes explicitly, construe it. I must admit that I still find the AP objection somewhat puzzling.
I only hope that my analysis will prompt others to respond in a way that
will allay the puzzlement.
2. The AP Objection and Some Responses
Sober construes DA as a likelihood argument: the fine-tuning of the universe,
or the fact that the constants are, and initial conditions were, just right for
the eventual existence of intelligent life—call this fact ‘R’—is claimed to
be more likely on the hypothesis of intelligent design (HD) than on the
See Manson, “Introduction,” pp. 2–3.
This formulation is taken from Philosophy and Faith: A Philosophy of Religion
Reader, ed. David Shatz (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2002), p. 554, glossary entry
“Anthropic Principle.” Shatz notes that there is a different, and in a sense opposite,
claim that has been referred to as ‘the anthropic principle’: it is the very claim that
is the basis of the fine-tuning argument, i.e., that “the initial conditions, laws, and
constants of the universe are fine-tuned for the creation of human life, which suggests an intelligent God who designed the universe.”
5
See, e.g., John Leslie, Universes (London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 13–14, and
107–108.
6
Elliott Sober, “The Design Argument,” in Manson, pp. 27–54; see 43–49. This
survey article appears also in The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Religion, ed.
William E. Mann (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), pp. 117–147; see 133–140. An earlier
presentation of the objection can be found in John D. Barrow and Frank J. Tipler,
The Anthropic Cosmological Principle (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986); see,
e.g., pp. 1–2. Barrow and Tipler, as well as Sober, cite Brandon Carter, “Large Number Coincidences and the Anthropic Principle in Cosmology,” in Confrontation of
Cosmological Theories with Observation, ed. M. S. Longair (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1974).
3
4
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hypothesis of “mindless natural processes” (HM) [i.e., P(R | HD) > P(R
| HM)]; therefore R favors HD over HM. On this construal of DA, the
conclusion is weaker than that of most presentations of the argument. For
it is not claimed that HD is true, or even probably true, or even more
worthy of acceptance than HM; rather all that is claimed is that, all else being equal, R (i.e., the fine-tuning of the universe for life) supports HD over
HM. Sober argues, however, that this construal of DA is more defensible
than stronger, more standard construals—e.g., as an argument by analogy
or as an inference to the best explanation. (We will examine below some of
his arguments for this claim.) DA, on this weak construal, could still play
a role in the theistic debate by contributing to a cumulative case for accepting HD, and ultimately a full-blown theism; or, as I will suggest below, it
may significantly enhance the (subjective) plausibility of HD or of theism
for some people, given their background assumptions.
Sober begins his presentation of the AP objection with a well-known
example due to Sir Arthur Eddington. A fisherman casts his net in a lake
many times and collects a large sample of fish. Noting that all the fish in his
sample are at least ten inches long, the fisherman infers that all the fish in
the lake are at least ten inches long. However, his net is made in such a way
that any fish that is less than ten inches long cannot be caught by it. Clearly,
then, his inference is not well-founded; for his sample was biased, due to
his method of collecting it. What is wrong with the fisherman’s procedure
is that it involves what is known as an ‘observation (or observational) selection effect’ (OSE). Generally, an OSE consists in the fact that one’s observed
evidence is affected, or limited, by the method of observation, or even by
the very act of observation; in the most extreme case, the act or method
of observation precludes observing any data other than what supports a
particular hypothesis or conclusion. In assessing the plausibility, based on
evidence, of a given hypothesis, we must take into account all the relevant
factors, including any OSE that might be involved. (Perhaps a simpler example of the fallacy of ignoring an OSE is that of someone whose roommate has accused her of snoring, and she denies the accusation, arguing
that she stayed up all last night and observed that she did not snore.)
In order to see the analogy between DA and the fisherman case, we first
need to construe the fisherman’s inference as a likelihood argument: he argues that his evidence O, that is, his observing only fish that are at least ten
inches long, is more likely on the hypothesis (HB—for big fish) that all the
fish in the lake are at least ten inches long than on the hypothesis (HL—
for little fish) that the lake contains fish that are less than ten inches long
[i.e., P(O | HB) > P(O | HL)]; so O favors HB over HL. This argument fails
to take into account the OSE consisting in the fact that he observed only
fish caught in his net, and the net could not catch fish less than ten inches
long. Taking the OSE into account means comparing the likelihood of O,
given HB plus the proposition that the OSE was present [i.e., P(O|HB &
OSE)], with the likelihood of O, given HL plus the proposition that the
OSE was present [i.e., P(O|HL & OSE)]. But since P(O|OSE) = 1, it follows
that P(O|HB & OSE) = P(O|HL & OSE) = 1, so that O does not really favor
either of the hypotheses in question.
Sober claims that DA also involves an OSE. He argues that the data
R that form the basis of DA could not have been otherwise, given that
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they were gathered by human observers. Human observers, who are examples of intelligent life, could not have observed that the constants etc.
were not right for the existence of intelligent life. This is a straightforward
consequence of AP. Once we take this OSE into account, as we must if
we want to reason cogently, we find that the likelihood of the constants’
being right is 100%, on any hypothesis, and so their being right does not
favor any hypothesis over any other. Thus, though the cosmic fine-tuning,
R, would prima facie seem to support HD over HM, nevertheless, in light
of the OSE, we see that it does not. Schematically: we might initially think
that P(R|HD) > P(R|HM), and so R favors HD over HM; but that would be
only because we fail to take into account the OSE. Once we explicitly take
the OSE into account, we get the result that P(R|HD & OSE) = P(R|HM &
OSE) =1. This, then, is the AP objection to DA.
John Leslie, followed by Richard Swinburne and others, proposed an
example to counter the claim that DA is undermined by an OSE. Here is my
version of the example: Suppose a prisoner, Jones, is standing before a firing squad of sharpshooters, the order is given to fire, and each member of
the squad fires several shots in Jones’s direction; but after the shooting has
stopped, Jones finds himself still alive with nary a bullet hole in him. He asks
himself whether his survival is the result of a stupendous coincidence—i.e.,
that every one of the sharpshooters in the firing squad happened to miss
the intended target (Jones) with every shot—or whether it is the result of
design—i.e., it was a fake execution, and the members of the firing squad
purposely missed Jones. And suppose, as seems reasonable, he figures that
his survival is much more likely on the hypothesis of design than on the hypothesis of coincidence, or accident; and so his survival favors the former
hypothesis over the latter. Now according to the reasoning behind the AP
objection to DA, Jones should not ask the question, and he is not justified in
adopting his answer, because his data involve an OSE; that is, since he must
be alive if he is to make observations, he could not possibly have observed,
after the shooting, any alternative to what he in fact observed, namely, that
the firing squad failed to kill him. However, it seems obvious, first of all,
that it is perfectly appropriate for Jones to think about this question—after
all, his surviving the firing squad cries out for explanation—and, secondly,
that he is justified in concluding that his survival favors the hypothesis of
design over the hypothesis of chance, since it is much more likely that the
sharpshooters missed him because they intended to than that they missed
him by chance even though they tried to kill him. So there must be something wrong with the reasoning behind the AP objection.7
Sober bites the bullet (so to speak) and maintains that indeed Jones in
the example is not entitled to say that his surviving the firing squad is
more likely on the hypothesis (HF) of a fake execution than on the hypothesis (HR) of a real attempted execution which happened to go wrong, and
to infer that therefore his survival favors the former hypothesis over the
latter; and the reason is that his saying so would involve overlooking the
Sober, “The Design Argument,” in Mann, p. 137; and in Manson, p. 46; John
Leslie, Universes, pp. 13–14, 107–108; Richard Swinburne, “Argument from the
Fine-Tuning of the Universe,” in Physical Cosmology and Philosophy, ed. J. Leslie
(New York: Macmillan, 1990), p. 171.
7
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OSE in the case.8 Why, then, does it seem so obvious that Jones would be
justified in inferring that his survival favors HF over HR? Sober suggests
two possible explanations. First, unlike Jones himself, a bystander who
witnessed the event could very well inquire as to why Jones survived, and
would be justified in concluding that Jones’s survival (S) favors HF over HR.
What misleads Leslie, Swinburne, and those of us who fall for this proposed
counterexample may be our confusing Jones’s standpoint with that of the
bystander.9 Second, it is specifically a likelihood argument that is illegitimate
for Jones; Jones would indeed be justified in constructing, instead, a probability argument concluding that his survival renders HF more probable than
it would otherwise have been [i.e., that P(HF | S) > P(HF)]. As for DA, Sober
goes on to argue that, unlike Jones’s inference, DA cannot be interpreted as
a probability argument, due to the absence of relevant background data on
which to base the assignments of the prior probability of HD [i.e., P(HD)]
and the conditional probability of HD on R [i.e., P(HD|R)].10
Now Sober’s first suggested explanation seems somewhat bizarre.11
After all, one would think that whether evidence favors one hypothesis
8
Sober has changed his mind about this. See his “Absence of Evidence and
Evidence of Absence,” an unpublished paper available on Sober’s website: http://
philosophy.wisc.edu/sober/Absence%20of%20Evidence%20and%20Ev%20of%20
Abs%20aug%202%202008.pdf . He now would admit that Jones is justified in constructing a likelihood argument to the effect that his survival favors the hypothesis
(HF) that the marksmen intentionally missed over the hypothesis (HR) that they
tried to kill him but missed due to chance. He now meets the challenge posed by
the counterexample by analyzing it as being relevantly different from DA (see
“Absence of Evidence and Evidence of Absence,” pp. 33–34). But he does not tell
us what arguments convinced him to change his mind; hence I state, here and in
what follows, his earlier position along with arguments of my own that I think
played some part in changing his mind. As for his new analysis of the “difference”
between the firing-squad case and DA, he basically makes two points: (1) that
the evidence should be not just that the constants are right (R), but the fact that
we observe that the constants are right [O(R)]; and (2) that we should time-index
the various events involved in both the evidence and the hypotheses. On (1), see
below in the text, where I argue that it makes no difference whether we deal with R
or O(R). As for (2), I do not see how Sober’s time-indexing succeeds in distinguishing between the firing-squad case and DA in the relevant way. To be somewhat
more specific, I think he chooses an event in the firing-squad case that does not
really correspond to its intended analogue in DA; inserting an event that does
correspond renders the case essentially the same as DA.
9
Sober, “The Design Argument,” p. 138; and in Mann, p. 137; and in Manson,
p. 47.
10
Ibid., in Mann, pp. 139–140; and in Manson, pp. 48–49. But it seems to me
that to the extent that we have no background information on which to base the
assignments of the probabilities P(HD) and P(HD|R), we similarly do not have the
background data on which to base the assignments of the probabilities P(R|HD)
and P(R|HM). For example, just as we can have no data as to what percentage of
fine-tuned universes have been designed, so also we can have no data as to what
percentage of designed universes have been fine-tuned.
11
See Jonathan Weisberg, “Firing Squads and Fine-Tuning: Sober on the Design Argument,” British Journal of Philosophy of Science 56 (2005), pp. 809–821, esp.
814–815.
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over another should not depend essentially on who is drawing the inference. If the bystander is justified in inferring that the evidence S favors HF
over HR, then so is anyone else, including Jones. Presumably Jones would
construct an argument just like one that an intelligent bystander would
have constructed. After all, you don’t have to be a rocket scientist to figure out that all the sharpshooters’ repeatedly missing Jones, from normal
firing-squad range, is more likely if they intend to miss him than if they
intend to hit him. There is no reason to think that Jones’ argument need
be less likely to lead to a true conclusion than the very same argument
constructed by a bystander, just because Jones, rather than the bystander,
did the work. I therefore see no sense in which it should be inappropriate or “illegitimate” for Jones to construct and accept the argument. So it
seems to me that Sober would do better to admit that Jones is justified in
concluding that the evidence favors HF over HR, and to try to distinguish
between Jones’s inference and DA. Perhaps (though I have my doubts) a
relevant distinction could be worked out on the basis of the fact that in the
case of DA no one, or at least no one who is a biological organism, is in a
position to justifiably draw the conclusion in question, whereas in the case
of Jones and the firing squad, others are in a position to justifiably draw
the relevant conclusion (and therefore so is Jones).
As for Sober’s saying that the likelihood argument is illegitimate for
Jones, but the probability argument is legitimate, I find this difficult to
maintain. By ‘probability argument’ Sober seems to mean an argument that
HF is more probable, given Jones’s survival (S), than it otherwise would
have been [i.e., P(HF|S) > P(HF)]. But it seems to me that such a probability
argument also requires that HF renders S more likely than it would otherwise have been [i.e., that P(S|HF) > P(S)]. For at least part of what makes
HF more likely, given S, than it otherwise would have been seems to be
the fact that HF renders S more likely than it would otherwise be. At least
according to Bayes’ theorem, the probability of HF given S [i.e., P(HF|S)] is
greater than the prior probability of HF [i.e., P(HF)] only if S is more likely
on HF than it otherwise would be. [I.e., P(HF | S) > P(HF) if and only if
P(S | HF) > P(S).] That is, according to Bayes’ theorem, P(HF|S) = [P(HF)
x P(S|HF) / P(S)]; so P(HF|S) is related to P(HF) by a factor of P(S|HF) /
P(S). Therefore, if P(S|HF) < P(S), then P(HF|S) < P(HF); and in particular,
if P(S|HF) = P(S), then P(HF|S) = P(HF). Thus if S is no more likely on HF
than otherwise, then HF cannot be rendered more probable by S than it
would otherwise have been. Therefore, if we are forced to say that, given
the OSE involved, the likelihood of S, whether or not HF is given, is 100%
[i.e., that P(S) = P(S|HF) = 1], then P(HF | S) is no greater than P(HF), and so
the probability argument gets us no further than the likelihood argument.
Thus the reasoning behind the AP objection to DA would undermine the
probability argument as well as the likelihood argument.12
12
Ibid., pp. 812–813, seems to interpret Sober as saying that the inference that
Jones is justified in making is that the conditional probability of HF (fake execution) is greater than that of HR (real execution), i.e., that P(HF|S) > P(HR|S). He
therefore presents a somewhat different counterexample, which he credits to Frank
Arntzenius, in which, he claims, no such conditionalization argument is available.
I do not think that the conditionalization argument is what Sober had in mind.
But it doesn’t really matter; for this conditionalization argument also is dependent
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Thus it seems that neither of Sober’s attempts to explain away the persuasiveness of Leslie’s and Swinburne’s counterexample is successful.
However, a counterexample does not in itself analyze, or explain, what
is wrong with the position that it (apparently) refutes. Jonathan Weisberg
has offered an analysis that purports to explain why OSE undermines neither Jones’s argument nor DA.13 Weisberg suggests that Jones does not
know that he will observe that he has survived the firing-squad; if he did,
he “would not have to worry about being shot!” All Jones knows is that
if he will observe whether he has survived, he will observe that he has survived. But this latter conditional statement does not entail the evidence in
question (i.e., Jones’s survival, or his observation of his having survived),
and so does not undermine Jones’s argument.
In order to understand Weisberg’s application of the above point to
the AP objection to DA, we must note that a distinction has been made
between the weak anthropic principle (WAP) and various stronger anthropic principles. WAP says that “what we can expect to observe must be
restricted by the conditions necessary for our presence as observers”14; in
other words, we cannot (correctly) observe that any necessary conditions
of our existence have not been satisfied. A stronger anthropic principle
would add that our existence as observers explains the fact that all necessary conditions of our existence have been satisfied. Sober apparently
claims that WAP is sufficient to undermine DA.15 Weisberg argues that
WAP does not entitle us to claim that we will observe a fine-tuned universe; “at best,” it entitles us to claim only that if we observe whether the
universe is fine-tuned, we will observe that it is fine-tuned. Again, the latter conditional statement does not entail the evidence (i.e., the fine-tuning,
or our observation of the fine-tuning), and so does not undermine DA. As
for stronger anthropic principles, these do not apply to the case of DA.
Now with respect to the firing-squad case, it seems that Weisberg is
assuming that in order for some fact to function as an OSE for a given person, it must be something that the person was aware of before the evidence
in question came to the person’s attention. He gives no argument for this
on the likelihood argument: If we assume that HF and HR have the same initial
probability, then Bayes’ theorem yields: P(HF|S) > P(HR|S) if and only if P(S|HF)
> P(S|HR). But again, if P(S) = 1, then P(S|HF) = P(S|HR) = 1; so again we get
nowhere. And even if we factor in the initial probabilities of HF and HR, we get a
similar result. For presumably real executions are more common than fake executions, so P(HR) > P(HF). Yet intuitively Jones’s survival seems to make the fakeexecution hypothesis more likely than the (failed) real-execution hypothesis, i.e.,
P(HF|S) > P(HR|S); again according to Bayes’ theorem, this means that [P(S|HF)
x P(HF)] > [P(S|HR) x P(HR)], and since P(HR) > P(HF), again P(S|HF) must be
greater (this time, much greater) than P(S|HR). So if we insist that the likelihood
of survival, on any hypothesis, is always 100%, we cannot infer that S renders HF
more probable than it renders HR, any more than we can infer that S renders HF
more probable than HF would otherwise have been.
13
Ibid., pp. 816–819.
14
Carter, “Large Number Coincidences,” 291; quoted by Sober, “The Design
Argument,” in Mann, p. 135, and in Manson, pp. 44–45.
15
See Sober, “The Design Argument,” in Mann, p. 135, and note 16 on p. 143;
and in Manson, pp. 44–45, and note 14 on pp. 51–52.
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assumption, as far as I can see. But in any event, that assumption, per se,
is irrelevant to DA; for we did know, long before anyone investigated the
cosmic constants and initial conditions, that intelligent life exists, and that
therefore all necessary conditions of the existence of intelligent life must
be satisfied. As for Weisberg’s argument about what WAP entitles us to
claim, I think that Sober can simply sidestep this argument by saying that
his objection to DA does not rest essentially on what WAP does or does
not entitle us to claim. Rather it rests on the general requirement of inductive logic that we consider the total evidence available to us. WAP merely
serves the heuristic function of pointing toward a relevant bit of background evidence: we know that we are intelligent biological organisms;
our existence as intelligent biological organisms entails that all necessary
conditions of the existence of intelligent life must have been satisfied—in
particular, it entails that the constants and the initial conditions must have
been right for the existence of intelligent life. Taking these background
facts into account entails that the evidence in question cannot favor any
hypothesis over any other via a likelihood argument. And that is enough to
undermine DA.16 Therefore, if we think that the AP objection goes wrong,
we should look for an alternative analysis of how, or why, it goes wrong.
William Lane Craig has suggested that the fallacy in the AP objection is
as follows: “An observer who has evolved within a universe should regard
it as highly probable that he will find the basic conditions of that universe
fine-tuned for his existence; but he should not infer that it is therefore
highly probable that such a fine-tuned universe exists.” 17 I find this and
others of Craig’s statements rather cryptic, but he seems to be saying that
although given that we are intelligent life forms, the fine-tuning of the universe for intelligent life is not surprising nevertheless, in itself—i.e., if it
is not given that we are intelligent life forms—the fine-tuning of the universe, along with the consequent existence of intelligent life, is surprising.
But if that is what he means, then Sober can simply appeal to the principle
of total evidence, and insist that we must take into account the fact that
we are intelligent life forms, and so (given this fact) the fine-tuning of the
universe must be considered unsurprising.
Another interpretation that the text of Craig’s argument might bear is
as follows: The proponent of the AP objection is confused about what constitutes the evidence in DA—about whether it is the fine-tuning R itself or
the fact that we observe the fine-tuning O(R). Whereas our existence as intelligent biological organisms renders O(R) unsurprising, it does not render
R unsurprising; and it is R, not O(R), that constitutes the evidence in DA.
R is surprising, but is less so on HD than on HM; therefore, R favors HD
over HM, as DA requires. If this is what he means, then it seems that Sober
would simply insist that, in accordance with the principle of total evidence,
we must consider O(R), and not merely R, as our evidence.18 And since, as
16
Sober, in a personal communication, as well as in “Absence of Evidence and
Evidence of Absence,” agrees with me.
17
William Lane Craig, “Design and the Anthropic Fine-Tuning of the Universe,”
in Manson, pp. 169–170.
18
See Sober, “Absence of Evidence and Evidence of Absence” (pp. 20ff. in the
most recent version I’ve seen).
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Craig admits, O(R) is unsurprising, and presumably equally unsurprising
whether on HD or on HM, the AP objection succeeds in undermining DA.
However, I think the truth of the matter is that our existence as intelligent living beings does render R, and not just O(R), unsurprising. That is,
given our existence as intelligent living beings, it is unsurprising that the
conditions were right for the existence of intelligent life; for if we exist,
then of course the necessary conditions of our existence must have been
satisfied. In fact, I think that it makes no difference, with respect to the
AP objection to the likelihood version of DA, whether we take R or O(R)
as our evidence. Either way, DA is undermined essentially by our taking
into account that the observers are intelligent living beings (our OSE). If
we do not take the OSE into account, neither O(R) nor R is very likely, and
both O(R) and R are more likely on HD than on HM. And if we do take the
OSE into account, then O(R) is just as likely on HD as on HM, and so is R;
and the likelihood of R, given the OSE, is effectively 100%. Schematically,
P[O(R) | HD] > P[O(R) | HM], just as P[R | HD] > P[R | HM]; but P[O(R)
| HD & OSE] = P[O(R) | HM & OSE], and P[R | HD & OSE] = P[R | HM
& OSE] =1. Thus, construing the evidence as O(R) rather than R is neither
necessary nor sufficient for the AP objection, whereas conditionalizing on
our OSE is both necessary and sufficient.
One might attempt to analyze the flaw in the AP objection as follows:
Though the observers’ being intelligent living beings entails that the constants must be right for intelligent life, it does not entail that the constants
and initial conditions had to be fine-tuned in order to enable intelligent life
to exist. What physicists have discovered is not simply that the values of
the constants and the nature of the initial conditions were such-and-such
and that these actual circumstances enabled intelligent life to develop;
rather the startling discovery here is that the values of the constants and
the nature of the initial conditions all had to fall within an extremely narrow range in order to enable intelligent life to exist. It is not merely that
the constants are right; it is that the constants are just right. What cries out
for explanation, what seems initially so unlikely (and therefore leads us to
search for a hypothesis on which it would be less unlikely), is the fact that
there is such a delicate balance among so many mutually independent factors, that had any of these factors been even slightly otherwise—as, for all
we know, they very well could have been—life would have been impossible. It is this delicate balance (B) that is rendered more likely by the design
hypothesis (HD) than by the mindless-forces hypothesis (HM); and the
fact that the discoverers of this balance are intelligent biological organisms
makes no difference to the relative likelihoods. In other words, not only is
P(B|HD) > P(B|HM), but equally P(B|HD & OSE) > P(B|HM & OSE).
But I think that the proponent of the AP objection has an effective response to this analysis: Though our existence (as intelligent living beings)
does not in itself logically entail that there be such a delicate balance of
independent physical factors, nevertheless, given the fundamental laws of
nature, which together delimit the domain of the physically possible, we
can say that our existence physically, or nomologically, entails that there be
such a delicate balance. That is, given our existence, it is physically necessary
that the initial conditions and the values of the constants should fall within
the relevant limited range; for if the values had not fallen within that range,
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our existence would have been impossible, according to the fundamental
laws of physics. There does, therefore, seem to be an OSE-problem with
saying that the fine-tuning of the universe for intelligent life is more likely
on HD than on HM; for, given that the discoverers of the fine-tuning are
intelligent living beings, and given the fundamental laws of nature, the
likelihood of the fine-tuning is 100% on either hypothesis—that is, P(B |
HD & OSE) = P(B | HM & OSE) = 1. (I did not explicitly refer to the fundamental laws of nature in these schemata, because these laws figure in
virtually every probability, but are generally not explicitly referred to.)
3. Overcoming the Problem
So what, if anything, is really wrong with the AP objection? In this section,
I will try to show that application of a rather well-known distinction can
effectively explain away the objection. It is the fact that the distinction in
question is so well-known that is the source of my puzzlement over the
AP objection and over why as talented and sophisticated a philosopher as
Sober thinks that the objection is significant.
I want to argue, first, that though the observers’ being intelligent living
beings (nomologically) entails that the conditions are right for intelligent
life, it does not explain why the conditions are right for intelligent life, and,
secondly, that this fact is the key to understanding how DA avoids invalidation by its involving an OSE.
The first point does not, I think, require much argument. The sense in
which the observers’ being intelligent living beings does not explain why
the conditions are just right for the existence of intelligent life, if it is not
obvious, can be made clear by considering a well-known example from the
literature on scientific explanation.19 According to C. G. Hempel’ s model
of explanation, a deduction of the proposition that a particular event e
occurred, from laws of nature and propositions about other particular
events, constitutes an explanation of e. More generally, if knowledge of
certain particular facts and the relevant laws of nature would together lead
us to expect a given event to have occurred, then that knowledge provides
an explanation of that event.20 Thus, for example, since we can deduce the
length of a certain flagpole’s shadow from the height of the flagpole plus
the position of the sun and the laws governing the propagation of light,
we have an explanation of the length of the shadow. The problem is that
we can just as well deduce the height of the flagpole from the length of
the shadow plus the position of the sun and the laws of the propagation
of light; so according to Hempel’s theory, the same facts and laws provide
not only an explanation of the length of the shadow based on the height
19
The example is due to Sylvain Bromberger, “Why-Questions,” in Mind and
Cosmos: Essays in Contemporary Science and Philosophy, ed. Robert G. Colodny (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1966), pp. 86–111.
20
See Carl G. Hempel, “Aspects of Scientific Explanation” in Aspects of Scientific
Explanation and other Essays in the Philosophy of Science, ed. Carl G. Hempel (New
York: MacMillan, 1965). For a briefer presentation of the same basic ideas, see
Hempel, Philosophy of Natural Science (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1966),
chap. 5.
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of the flagpole, but also an explanation of the height of the flagpole based
on the length of its shadow. However, though the height of the flagpole
(given the position of the sun and the laws of light propagation) does explain the length of the shadow, nevertheless, intuitively at least, the length
of the shadow (etc.) does not explain the height of the flagpole. Hempel
himself apparently maintained that, despite our intuitions to the contrary,
we really can explain the height of the flagpole in terms of the length of its
shadow, as well as vice-versa.21 However, it seems clear that the height of
the flagpole explains the length of its shadow in a way that the length of
the shadow does not explain the height of the flagpole; we might say that
the height of the flagpole is the basis of a causal explanation of the length
of its shadow, whereas the length of the shadow is not the basis of a causal
explanation of the height of the flagpole.
Similarly, in the case of the AP objection to DA, though the observers’
being intelligent living organisms (given the fundamental laws of nature)
entails the constants’ being just right for the existence of intelligent life,
nevertheless their being intelligent living organisms does not form the basis of a causal explanation of the constants’ being right for the existence of
intelligent life; rather the causality is the other way around.22
I suggest that the relevant difference between DA and Eddington’s fisherman case—that is, what makes the latter, but not the former, a case of
fallacious reasoning—is just this difference between entailing and causally explaining. In the fisherman case, the circumstances of observation or
data-gathering (in particular, the nature of the fisherman’s net) not only
entail, but also might very well explain why, the gathered data are as they
are (i.e., why all the observed fish are all at least ten inches long); but in
the case of DA, the circumstances of observation (in particular, the fact
that the observers are alive) entail, but do not explain why, the data are as
they are (i.e., why the conditions are just right for life). Thus it may very
well be that all the fish in the sample gathered by the fisherman are at least
ten inches long because the holes in the net used to gather the sample are
large enough that any fish less than ten inches long will slip through. But
the constants cannot be said to be right for the existence of intelligent life
because those who discovered them are biological organisms; if anything,
it is the other way around—it is because the constants are right for the
existence of intelligent life that the biological organisms who discovered
that fact could exist. Similarly, in Leslie’s example of the firing squad, the
survival of the prisoner (Jones) entails, but does not causally explain, the
marksmen’s not hitting him. So we cannot say that they missed him because he survived, and therefore his inference that they missed, and consequently he survived, because the execution was fake is not fallacious.23
21
See Hempel, Aspects, pp. 352–354; and see Peter Godfrey-Smith, Theory and
Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2003), p. 194.
22
See Sober, “The Design Argument,” in Mann, p. 135; and in Manson, pp.
44–45.
23
See Stephen T. Davis, “Fine-Tuning: The New Design Arguments,” in Philosophy and Faith, ed. Shatz, p. 227. This is an excerpt from Davis, God, Reason, and
Theistic Proof (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1997).
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This last point requires some clarification, since there are at least two
different uses of ‘because’ (or contexts of its use). What I have said about
‘because’ in the preceding paragraph is true on only one of these uses
of the word. Consider the following example (with apologies to Daniel
Defoe): Imagine Robinson Crusoe, marooned on a desert island. One day
he sees footprints in the sand, and he knows that they are not his; so he
says aloud, ‘Aha, there is someone else on this island, because there are
footprints here that are not mine.’ But then someone (who will eventually
be known as ‘Friday’) taps him on the shoulder and says, ‘Excuse me,
but you have it exactly backwards. There are footprints here that are not
yours, because there is someone else besides you on this island.’ If we like,
we can imagine them conducting a protracted debate over the issue of
which one of them is right. But of course, both are right. Crusoe is using
his ‘because’-sentence to indicate the direction of his inference, or epistemic
direction—his knowledge of the presence of someone else on the island
was brought about by his knowledge of the footprints, and not vice-versa.
Friday, on the other hand, is using his ‘because’-sentence to indicate the
direction of causality between the facts about which Crusoe was thinking—
the (actual) footprints were caused, or brought about, by the (actual) presence of someone else on the island, and not vice-versa. Similarly, it would
not be incorrect to say ‘Conditions are right for the existence of intelligent
life, because we are intelligent living organisms’, as long as the sentence
is meant to indicate epistemic direction or the direction of entailment, and
not the direction of causality between the facts we are talking about; if we
wanted to indicate the latter direction, we should say something like ‘We
exist as intelligent living organisms (only) because the conditions were
right for the existence of intelligent life.’ Just as the footprints indicate, but
did not bring about, the presence of a person, so also the observers’ being
alive entails, but did not bring about, the constants’ being right for life.
The above considerations seem to be leading toward construing DA as
an inference to the best causal explanation of the fact that the constants are
just right. But this is somewhat problematic for proponents of DA, since any
supernaturalistic explanation starts out with two strikes against it. That is,
the initial probability of any supernaturalistic hypothesis is extremely low
(at least for some people—see below), since it appeals to factors that are
different from anything in our ordinary or scientific experience. Therefore
I propose construing DA as a particular kind of comparative likelihood
argument, in which we limit ourselves to causal explanatory, or generative, considerations. That is, we should compare the hypotheses HD and
HM, viewed as possible stories of how it came about that the values of the
physical constants and the nature of the initial conditions fell within the
narrow ranges that enabled the development of intelligent life; and the
comparison should be based on the question: which of the hypotheses
posits antecedent conditions that would have been more likely to result in
the constants’ being right, given only the facts at the times that the stories
supposedly took place? At least part of what makes one hypothesis H1
a better causal explanation (or part of a better causal explanation) of the
data E than another hypothesis H2 is the following: If we, so to speak,
place ourselves back in time, before E came to be, then our believing H1
at that time would lead us to expect with greater confidence that E would
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come to exist than would our believing H2 at that time. In the case of DA,
the question is: would we have expected, with greater confidence, that the
various conditions would be perfectly balanced for the future existence of
intelligent life if we believed that those conditions were being determined
by an intelligent designer (HD) or if we believed that they were being
determined by mindless natural processes (HM)? I think that, given how
many mutually independent factors have to coincide, and with what degree of precision, in order to make intelligent life possible, we would have
been more confident in our expectation, in this sense, if we believed HD;
and so the evidence constituted by the fine-tuning favors HD over HM.
4. So What?
As was noted early on in this paper, a likelihood argument is a relatively
weak argument. This is true also of my “generative” likelihood argument.
That is, the conclusion of my likelihood argument is that the evidence R
favors HD over HM, viewed as competing causal, or generative, explanatory hypotheses; but that does not mean that HD is true, or worthy of
acceptance, or even that it is preferable to HM. Though R favors HD over
HM, nevertheless HM may be, overall, more worthy of acceptance than
HD. Two questions arise: first, can we enhance DA, or construct a different
version of it, so as to establish a more significant conclusion? And second,
if we cannot so enhance it, what is its value?
As to the first question, let us see if we can reconstruct DA as a Bayesian
argument for the conclusion that R renders HD more probable than HM,
i.e., that P(HD | R) > P(HM | R). Now any proponent of DA would rather
be able to establish the “Bayesian” conclusion that P(HD | R) > P(HM | R)
than merely the “likelihood” conclusion that P(R | HD) > P(R | HM). But
there is an obstacle in the way. The Bayesian argument can be viewed as
going beyond the likelihood argument by adding to it premises about the
initial plausibility of HD and of HM. For according to Bayes’ Theorem,
P(HD | R) > P(HM | R) if and only if [P(R | HD) x P(HD)] > [P(R |HM) x
P(HM)]. P(HD) is usually called the ‘prior probability’ of HD. Clearly, if
P(HD) is sufficiently lower than P(HM), then even though P(R | HD) > P(R
| HM), nevertheless P(HM | R) can be greater than P(HD | R). Well, what
is the prior probability of HD, as compared with that of HM?
An argument of Hume’s—one of the many arguments which he puts
into the mouth of the character Philo in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion—seems to lead to the conclusion that the prior probability of
HD is extremely low. Philo insists that the intelligent designer posited in
the design argument would be immensely different from anything in our
experience; and he argues that the greater the difference between a hypothesized entity and anything in our experience, the less the plausibility
of the hypothesis, all else being equal.24 I think that Philo here exposes a
significant weakness in most forms of the design argument.
In Part II of the Dialogues, Philo stresses the disanalogy between the effects—i.e.,
between the world and manmade machines. See, e.g., pp. 23–24 and 30–31 of the
Pike edition. He broadens his attack to include the disanalogy between the causes—
i.e., between God and human beings—in Part V, in which he goes on to argue that
24
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We may apply Philo’s point to our version of DA as follows: All the biological organisms, intelligent or otherwise, that we know of are such that,
given their chemical make-up, they could not have existed were it not for
the cosmic fine-tuning we find in the universe. If the intelligent designer
posited in HD is supposed to be responsible for the fine-tuning that enabled
such biological organisms to come into existence, then he himself presumably is not such a biological organism—i.e., his existence is not dependent
on the fine-tuning. (Otherwise, DA would not explain what it is supposed
to explain; it would be, to apply an analogy of Hume’s/Philo’s, like trying
to explain why the earth doesn’t fall by hypothesizing that it rests on the
back of an elephant—which, of course, immediately raises the question of
why the elephant doesn’t fall.) Thus the posited intelligent designer must
not be a biological organism; or if he is, he is radically unlike any biological
organism—in fact, radically unlike anything—that we have ever observed.
Given our experience—in particular, our experience of the dependence of
intelligence on neurological function—it does not seem at all plausible that
there is an intelligent being who is not a biological organism (or at least not
a biological organism in the normal sense—henceforth understood).
I think that the reason why the likelihood version of DA is preferable
to other versions—and perhaps Sober had this reason in mind—is that it
is, so to speak, sensitive to this weakness. It purports to establish only that
R favors HD over HM, not that, given R, HD is more probable than HM;
and the reason for this limitation is precisely that HD has very little initial
plausibility. What I am calling ‘initial plausibility’ can, I think, reasonably be taken as identical (or at least broadly proportional) to Bayesian
prior probability in this context. Thus, given that HD posits an intelligent
agent who is not a biological organism, and who therefore lacks (among
other things) a brain, it seems that P(HD) is significantly less than P(HM).
Therefore we may very well not be able to progress from the conclusion
of the (generative) likelihood argument, i.e., that P(R | HD) > P(R | HM),
to the stronger conclusion of the Bayesian argument, i.e., that P(HD |R) >
P(HM | R).25
But it does not follow that DA is useless. In order to understand how
DA might still have value for a theist, note first that Sober has a more
general, “in-principle” objection to the Bayesian argument than the one I
have just given. His objection is that assignments of prior probabilities to
HD and to HM would be subjective, differing from person to person, and
therefore would be out of place in an argument that purports to establish
an objective, logical relation between the evidence R and each of these two
the analogical design argument is stronger the more we make out the inferred designer, or designers, to be like human beings. See pp. 48ff. of the Pike edition.
25
Even the likelihood version of DA is itself based on the analogy between the
world (especially the fine-tuning thereof) and manmade machines, and that between the hypothesized intelligent designer of the world and the intelligent human designers of machines. Without these analogies, we would have no reason to
think that the fine-tuning is more likely due to design than to mindless processes.
But the traditional argument-by-analogy form of the design argument purports to
establish the stronger conclusion that probably there is (or at least was) an intelligent designer of the world; and this stronger conclusion is effectively countered
by Philo’s points about the disanalogies.
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hypotheses.26 This subjectivity is a general problem with Bayesian arguments, and Bayesians have suggested various solutions. But I think that,
at least in the case of DA, the subjective nature of the prior probability of
HD can be seen as an integral aspect of the argument. In fact, this kind of
subjective aspect can be used to defend the Bayesian argument against the
above Humean objection. Hume is right to insist that, from an empiricist
perspective at least, the difference between the hypothesized intelligent
designer and anything in our experience should make us feel that the hypothesis (HD) is initially implausible, or has a low prior probability. Nevertheless it may be that in fact some people feel more “at home” with the
posited designer, and with the hypothesis that posits him, than others.
That is, for some people, the idea of a disembodied intelligent creator is so
familiar that it does not strike them as being nearly as odd as the idea of,
say, the Loch Ness Monster or the Abominable Snowman or little green
men from Mars—even though these latter are far more similar to things
that we have actually observed than is the bodiless intelligent designer.
William James, in his famous essay “The Will to Believe,” distinguished
between ‘live’ and ‘dead’ hypotheses.27 For some people, HD is a live hypothesis, that is, one that they think might very well be true. This could be
due to their having been brought up in a religious environment, or to their
previous metaphysical speculations, or to any number of other reasons.
But given their relatively positive epistemic attitude toward HD, they will
make the jump from the conclusion of the likelihood argument to that of
the stronger Bayesian argument—i.e., from ‘P(R |HD) > P(R | HM)’ to
‘P(HD |R) > P(HM | R)’—because they assign a relatively high prior probability to HD. For others, perhaps due to a non-religious upbringing, or to
an empiricist attitude, HD is a dead hypothesis, one that has no epistemic
appeal to them whatsoever. Such people, even if they accept the likelihood
version of DA, would not accept the related Bayesian argument, because
for them, P(HD) is too low. What I am suggesting is that for people who
take HD seriously, it is proper to view DA as a Bayesian argument for the
conclusion that R renders HD more probable than HM.28
On the other hand, I can understand Sober’s insistence that we avoid
subjective considerations in discussing and evaluating DA. I can even understand someone for whom HD is a live hypothesis refusing to proceed
from the mere likelihood version of DA to the more committal Bayesian
version. Though I think it would be reasonable for such a person to accept the Bayesian conclusion, as I suggested above, nevertheless I think it
would also be reasonable for her to say, in effect, ‘I realize that my assigning a high prior probability to HD is not based on hard evidence, and so
I will resist the urge to draw conclusions based on this assignment.’ All
in all, I respect Sober’s preference for the likelihood argument over the
Sober, “The Design Argument,“ in Mann, p. 120; and in Manson, p. 30.
William James, “The Will to Believe,” in The Will to Believe and Other Essays
in Popular Philosophy, ed. William James (New York, 1897). The article is widely
anthologized; for example, in Shatz [see above, note 4].
28
Furthermore, for most people who are likely to be interested in DA, the only
live hypothesis that is in competition with HD is naturalism, or HM; so it is worthwhile to compare specifically these two hypotheses.
26
27
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Bayesian argument. But I think that, practically speaking, people who are
genuinely torn between believing in an intelligent designer of the world
and adopting a thoroughgoing naturalism may be led by DA to believe
in an intelligent designer; and I further believe, that if they do, they are
within their epistemic rights. But to argue for this latter claim is (as I often
say when I’m stumped) beyond the scope of this paper. I can only refer
the reader to James’s article, and generally to the literature on the epistemological propriety of beliefs not based on evidence.29
5. Conclusion
The anthropic principle may very well point to an OSE that undermines
DA construed as a straightforward likelihood argument. Our own existence entails that (short of a miracle) the necessary physical conditions for
intelligent life, no matter how improbable in themselves, must have been
satisfied—i.e., that the constants are just right (R). Therefore, P(R|HD &
OSE) = P(R|HM & OSE), and so R does not favor HD over HM.
What I have suggested here is that we view HD and HM as alternative
causal, or generative, accounts of how the universe came to be fine-tuned
for intelligent life; and that we ask which account posits antecedent conditions that, in themselves, would have rendered more likely the subsequent fine-tuning for intelligent life. The fact that we, who are asking, or
who discovered the extent of the fine-tuning, are intelligent living beings
is irrelevant to answering this question; and so is the fact that we know,
and have known for a long time, that intelligent life exists. Explicitly adding our current existence to the picture has no bearing on the comparative
plausibility of the competing generative accounts as such. The proponent
of DA claims that our experience of how various forms of mundane finetuning, or adaptation of means to ends, generally come about—i.e., that it
is imposed on inanimate matter by intelligent (human) designers—leads
us to prefer the HD account to the HM account on this score; and that in
so far forth, R favors HD over HM. Whatever other objections might be
raised against this claim, the AP objection is not a problem for it.
It seems to me that many who have been attracted to DA have viewed
DA, whether explicitly or implicitly, pretty much as I have described it—
that is, as an inference as to which of two causal, or generative, accounts
would render the fine-tuning of the universe antecedently more likely to
emerge. (I suspect that Craig, among others, was thinking of DA in this
way. And certainly the Leslie/Swinburne firing-squad example captures
this aspect of the case.) The AP objection invokes considerations that are
irrelevant to the question of what kind of earlier conditions brought about
the fine-tuning. I suggest that it is for this reason that supporters of DA
have tended to find the AP objection so puzzling; and that those who find
the objection cogent and persuasive do so because they view DA in some
other way. Perhaps defenders of the AP objection hold that if a given state
of affairs is to have been expected, then there is no need for, and no room
29
See, for example, Faith and Rationality: Reason and Belief in God, ed. Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press,
1983); and chap. 7 in Shatz (ed.).
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for, any further explanation of that state of affairs; and given our existence, plus the fundamental laws of nature, the fine-tuning that we find is
to have been expected, and so is already fully explained. However, we are
still left with a puzzle if we find it difficult to envisage antecedent conditions that could have yielded the data in question. In that case, there is still
room for inquiring as to the antecedent conditions that could have yielded
the data. I find it intuitively clear that whether or not our existence renders
the cosmic fine-tuning unsurprising, and whether or not our existence,
plus the fundamental laws of nature, can properly be said to ‘explain’ the
cosmic fine-tuning, there is still a felt need for a causal, generative account
of how the fine-tuning came about; and it is qua causal, generative account of how the fine-tuning came about that the design hypothesis is
supported in DA.
However, as we have noted, my construal of DA, like Sober’s, is relatively weak. It does not necessarily lead to the acceptance of HD. Whether
HD is ultimately acceptable depends also on how plausible HD is overall,
aside from its being favored by R. The overall plausibility of HD depends,
at least to some extent, on its initial plausibility; and as we have noted,
how plausible one initially finds HD may very well be a subjective matter,
differing from person to person, and depending on non-evidential factors. I suggest that most defenders of DA (subjectively) assign more or less
equal prior probability to HD and HM, and therefore may conclude that,
since the fine-tuning is more likely the result of design than of mindless
natural forces, the fine-tuning renders HD more probable than HM as an
explanatory hypothesis.30
Bar-Ilan University

30
Actually, neither HD nor HM is a very detailed hypothesis. Both are best
viewed as hypothesis-schemata, to be filled in with the details, either of the intentions and powers of the posited designer or of the nature of the relevant posited
mindless natural processes, respectively. I think it is fair to draw on religious traditions to fill out HD. As for HM, I think that part of the problem for naturalists
is that they currently have no way of filling out HM; scientists have no idea of
what kind of naturalistic processes could have originally determined the values of
the various constants or the initial conditions, so these constant-values and initial
conditions are effectively viewed as matters of pure chance. As for the question of
whether future scientific developments will enable the further articulation of HM,
and whether this articulation will undermine DA, I think the best answer for now
is: Let’s wait and see.
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